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It is not intellectually difficult to apply international law to cases
of domestic protest against nuclear arms. Perhaps the most difficult
hurdle is psychological: applying traditional legal principles in the
context of global annihilation.' Yet a central purpose of all law, in-
ternational and domestic, is to control excessive force. The sheer
magnitude of force represented by nuclear weapons thus mandates
level-headed analysis of legal principles by those who would chal-
lenge nuclear arms.
This Article presents a non-traditional, international law defense
for United States citizens facing criminal charges stemming from
their protest against nuclear weapons. Charges range from misde-
meanors, such as trespassing on private property (for those engaged
in peaceful protests),2 to felonious destruction of private and govern-
ment property (for protests involving violence).'
After outlining the traditional forms of the so-called Nuremberg
Defense, this article will propound its unconventional variation: the
use of international law as a basis for the domestic privilege of crime-
prevention.
I. THE TRADITIONAL FORM OF THE NUREMBERG DEFENSE.
Paradoxically, the original Nuremberg Defense and its basis was
precisely the opposite of its current and now traditional form. Yet to
understand this Article's non-traditional approach, one must be fa-
miliar with the traditional Nuremberg Defense. As outlined below,
particular attention should focus on the element of individual-citizen
responsibility for international crime. This concept will become a
key element in the non-traditional defense.
The first Nuremberg Defense arose from proceedings before the
International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg, Germany, at the
close of World War II. Certain German citizens, accused by victori-
ous Allied powers of international crimes, contended that they could
I. According to Larry Smith, National Security Studies Director at Harvard's Kennedy
School of Government, part of the psychological problem is one of scale. A single one-megaton
explosion in a large city would kill more people from the heat, blast and radiation than the
650,000 Americans who have ever died in battle in all the wars fought by the United States in
the last 200 years. "It's beyond our ability to conceive of such a thing .... Just to make the
attempt to think about it will take all the imagination and creativity of the human race." L.A.
Times, Aug. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 30.
2. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 602 (Deering 1979) (trespass to private property); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1975); Iowa CODE §§ 714.1-.7 (1975).
3. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 594 (Deering 1983) (destruction of private property);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.10, 240.6 (McKinney 1975) (destruction of property and riot); IOWA
CODE § 743.9 (1975).
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not be held responsible because they were not high government offi-
cials. They argued that they had not devised or ordered the alleged
criminal activity, but instead had been forced by German domestic
law to carry out their country's national policies.4
The premise of the Germans' defense derived from principles of
nineteenth century international law, from a time when such law
dealt primarily with relations between States.' In essence, the origi-
nal Nuremberg Defense argued that State governments were the only
proper subjects of international law; individual citizens were merely
the objects.6
One of the Nuremberg trials, commonly referred to as The Flick
Case, was prosecuted by the Allies against German industrialists.'
The major charge was the commission of crimes against peace in vio-
lation of international law. In Flick the War Crimes Tribunal stated:
It is urged that individuals holding no public offices and not repre-
senting the State, do not, and should not come within the class of
persons criminally responsible for a breach of international law. It
is asserted that international law is a matter wholly outside the
work, interest, and knowledge of private individuals. The distinc-
tion is unsound. International law, as such, binds every citizen
just as does ordinary municipal law. . . . The application of in-
ternational law to individuals is no novelty.
8
Individual responsibility was further buttressed by the 1948
American Military Tribunal (Tribunal VA) decision of United States
v. Von Leeb:
International law operates as a restriction and limitation on the
sovereignty of nations. It may also limit the obligations which in-
dividuals owe to their states, and create for them international ob-
ligations which are binding upon them to an extent that they must
be carried out even if to do so violates a positive law or directive of
state.9
Thus when United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H.
4. 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1283 (L. Friendman ed. 1972).
5. See Manner, The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law, 46 AM. J.
INT'L L. 428 (1952).
6. Id.
7. THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 4, at 1281.
8. Id. at 1284.
9. Reported in II TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS 462-489 (1950). See also, CHARTER OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (The Nuremberg Charter), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, E.A.S. No. 472. Article VII states: "The official position of defendants, whether as
heads of State or responsible officials in government, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility or mitigating punishment."
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Jackson represented the United States at Nuremberg, he observed
that:
For the first time four of the most powerful nations have agreed
not only upon the principle of liablility for war crimes of persecu-
tion, but also upon the principle of individual responsibility for the
crime of attacking international peace.
10
It is thus axiomatic that current international law creates rights
and obligations for individuals as well as governments."' Individual
responsibility for crimes under international law has been specifically
recognized by the United States Supreme Court. In permitting pros-
ecution of Nazi spies in this country for violating the 1907 Hague
Convention,' 2 the Court implicitly viewed the personal responsibility
issue as resolved by the fact that the defendants were free to choose
to violate international law.' 3
Subsequent to the Nuremberg trials were their Asian-theater
equivalent, known as the Tokyo War Crimes Trial Decision. '4 Com-
bined with those at Nuremberg, principles derived from Tokyo have
been interpreted as meaning that "anyone with knowledge of illegal
activity and an opportunity to do something about it is a potential
criminal under international law unless the person takes affirmative
measures to prevent the commission of the crimes."15
It is this latter gloss-some would say extension-of war tribu-
nal principles that comprises what is now the traditional form of the
Nuremberg Defense. Citizens accused of crimes, usually those in-
volving highly controversial public policy issues like nuclear arms
protests, cite the Nuremberg cases and their progeny as creating a
citizen privilege to break domestic law lest their action or non-action
be later judged criminal in an international tribunal. 6
10. Jackson, Statement of Chief U.S. Counsel Upon Signing of the Agreement, 19 TEMPLE
L.Q. 169 (1946).
11. Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, 1928 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 15 (Advisory Opinion
of Mar. 3); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
12. Hague Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, art. XXX, 36 Stat. 2351, T.S. 542.
13. See generally, Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
14. Reprinted in THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 4, at 1029.
15. Id.
16. C. COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS AND THE LAW 208 (1971).
One commentator summarizes the basis for such position:
[T]he very essence of the [Nuremberg] Charter is that individuals have international
duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individ-
ual State. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the State, if the State in authorizing actions moves
outside its competence under international law.
I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 545 (2d ed. 1973). The tradi-
tional Nuremberg Defense is sometimes combined with the contemporary defense of "civil
Vol. 16
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II. THE NON-TRADITIONAL APPROACH
The non-traditional Nuremberg Defense propounded by this
Article links modem international law principles of individual re-
sponsibility to the Anglo-American common law privilege of citizens
to prevent crime. Under this defense the various acts of nuclear-arms
protestors are regarded as attempts to prevent the actions of others
deemed criminal under international law. "y By linking the crime pre-
vention concept to that of individual responsibility, the traditional
Nuremberg Defense is given a novel and significant twist. Instead of
regarding themselves as international criminals unless they attempt to
thwart international crime within their country, 8 advocates of the
non-traditional point to others-those engaged in making nuclear
policy or weapons-as individually responsible for activity made
criminal by international law.
A. Genocide and Global Destruction Result From the Use of
Nuclear Weapons
Some facts are common to virtually any form of nuclear arms
protest. The three presented here are an essential predicate for ap-
plying specific provisions of international law. These facts, viewed in
the light of international law requirements, support the "reasonable-
ness" of a protestor's perception of the illegality of nuclear weapons,
a key component of the non-traditional Nuremberg Defense. 9
As a practical matter these facts are judicially admissible
through either expert testimony or judicial notice. Documentation is
disobedience," whereby adherents of H.D. Thoreau, J. Gandhi, and M.L. King, Jr., claim a
moral or religious compulsion to break a law regarded as immoral itself. Although this ap-
proach may appeal to the jury, it contains both internal and external contradictions. By having
defendants admit they broke the law, it undermines their crime-prevention claim that they were
enforcing the law. Apart from this, laws which nuclear-arms protestors are typically charged
with violating are usually unrelated to the issues of nuclear arms, e.g., trespass, destruction of
property, and conspiracy.
17. Beyond observing that citizen passivity has never been held tantamount to criminal
complicity by an international tribunal, attacking the doctrinal weakness of this position is
beyond the scope of this article. Cf COHEN, supra note 16, at 208-209.
18. This approach also differs from the defense of civil disobedience commonly associated
with nuclear-arms protests. Stemming from acts and writings of Thoreau, Gandhi, and Martin
Luther King, Jr., the traditional theory of civil disobedience requires illegal or immoral laws to
be violated. In contrast, the defense propounded here has no quarrel with laws of any govern-
ment (most of which, like trespass, obstructing, and destroying property, are "nuclear neu-
tral"), but rather focuses on the actions of individuals. Rather than rejecting the authority of
domestic law, the non-traditional Nuremberg Defense relies upon it.
19. See infra notes 95-121 and accompanying text.
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provided for the first two facts, the third will, of course, depend on
the nature of the target of the nuclear arms protest in question.
First, nuclear weapons instantly destroy virtually everything
within several miles of the explosion. The result causes indiscrimi-
nate suffering and death among military and civilian populations,
and through the after effects of firestorms, deadly radiation and long-
term dust clouds can lead to the annihilation of all life on earth.2°
Second, since 1981 the United States House of Representatives,
states, cities, townships, and citizens' groups throughout the world
have attempted in vain to halt the nuclear arms race by passing reso-
lutions condemning nuclear arms and calling for a nuclear weapons
freeze. Some countries have declared their territory off limits to the
installation or passage of nuclear weapons. The United Nations has
been passing similar resolutions for the last twenty years.2'
20. The single composite "fact" in the text is supported by the following specific factual
documentation:
(a) The use of nuclear weapons causes virtually total destruction of everything within
several miles of the site of the explosion. U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS (1977).
(b) A limited or "counter-force attack" of nuclear weapons would kill up to 20,000,000
people immediately and cause millions more cancer deaths and genetic defects; an all-out at-
tack on a range of military and economic targets using a large fraction of the existing nuclear
arsenal would cause up to 160,000,000 immediate deaths and millions more cancer deaths and
genetic defects. Efforts of civil defense programs to save lives and provide shelter would, in the
wake of such destruction, be meaningless. U.S. CONGRESS: OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT (May 1979).
(c) Residual effects caused by radiation and radioactive fallout create long-term illness
and death in a manner analogous to poisoning. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, THE
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 473 (1957).
(d) "[N]uclear weapons [possess] terrible effects [that include] suffering, indiscriminately
and inexorably, by military forces and civilian populations alike [and] constitute, through the
persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and
ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable." Treaty for the Prohibition of Nu-
clear Weapons in Latin America Feb. 14, 1967, preamble, 22 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137,
634 U.N.T.S. 281.
(e) Even low-level radiation exposure causes serious increases in the incidence of cancer,
leukemia, reproductive failure, genetic defects, diabetes, and cardiac diseases. A. Stewart, A
Survey of Childhood Malignancies, BRIT. MED. J. 1495-1508 (1958); J. GOFMAN, A. TAMPLIN,
POISONED POWER 26 (1971).
21. Similarly to Fact No. 1, this single fact is a composite of the following factual docu-
mentation:
(a) The United Nations General Assembly has passed many resolutions proscribing nu-
clear arms and insisting on cessation of the nuclear-arms race. See, e.g.: G.A. Res. 1380, 14
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); G.A. Res. 1643, 16 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 17) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); G.A. Res. 2162, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res. 2936, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5,
U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 2849, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 70, U.N. Doc.
A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 3246, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 87, U.N. Doc. A/9631
Vol. 16
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Third, the plant, business, or person protested against is know-
ingly involved in the research, development, manufacture, stockpil-
ing, use, or threatened use of nuclear weapons.
B. International Law Provides a Reasonable Basis for Believing
Nuclear Weapons are Illegal
Former Justice Newman of the California Supreme Court has
stated that "[t]he good lawyer ought to be able to work a plausible
argument that nuclear warfare inevitably involves aggression and an
(1974); G.A. Res. 3154, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A.
Res. 35/152, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 69, U.N. Doc A/3548 (1980).
(b) In March 1982 over 150 towns in Vermont adopted resolutions calling for a morato-
rium on the spread of nuclear weapons. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1982, at A16, col. 3; see also N.Y.
Times, Mar. 8, 1982 at A18, col. I.
(c) In March 1982 the Kennedy-Hatfield Nuclear Freeze Resolution (S.J. Res. 163) was
passed in the United States House of Representatives. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1982, at ES, col. 2;
N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1982, at 22, col. 1.
(d) In June 1982 700,000 people in New York City's Central Park marked the United
Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1982, at I, col. 2.
(e) In August 1982 the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association approved a
resolution recommending principles to guide United States policy on nuclear arms control.
Among these principles was a call "that nuclear powers pursue serious and sustained negotia-
tions to end the nuclear arms race and to reduce the number of nuclear weapons." Report No.
114 to the House of Delegates of the ABA: Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities,
Standing Committee on World Order Under Law, Aug. 1982, discussed in 48 A.B.A. J. 1186
(1982).
(f) On September 14, 1982, Wisconsin adopted, by a margin of three to one, a statewide
voter-initiated referendum calling upon the United States government to "work vigoroursly to
negotiate a mutual nuclear weapons moratorium and reduction, with appropriate verification,
with the Soviet Union and other nations." N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1982, at B17, col. 4.
(g) During the November 1982 nationwide elections in the United States, voters endorsed
a grass-roots movement, urging the United States and the Soviet Union to adopt a mutual
nuclear weapons freeze. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, at A22, col. 4.
(h) On December 7, 1982, thousands of women assembled on the Greenham Common,
England, then-proposed site of United States cruise missiles, petitioning for disarmament and
the barring of nuclear missiles from their country. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982, at A5, col. 1.
(i) The widely circulated Catholic Bishop's pastoral letter, "The Challenge of Peace:
God's Promise and Our Response" condemned the nuclear arms race and offered proposals to
reduce the level of nuclear arms. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1982, at Al, col. I.
() On April 5, 1983, the fourth day of demonstrations against the nuclear arms race in-
volved an estimated 400,000 people in Bonn, West Germany. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1983, at A9,
col. 4.
(k) The last few years have seen the increased appearance of national professional organi-
zations devoting their expertise towards stopping the nuclear arms race. These include Law-
yers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Union of
Concerned Scientists, High Technology Professionals for Peace, Student/Teacher Organization
to Prevent Nuclear War, United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War, Nuclear Weapons Freeze
Campaign, Mobilization for Survival, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom,
Women's Pentagon Action, and the National Resistance Committee.
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illegal breach of the peace."2 2 The non-traditional Nuremberg De-
fense involves proof of both more and less than the above
proposition.
Those protesting the research, development, manufacture,
stockpiling, and deployment of nuclear arms have a greater burden
than demonstrating the illegality of actually using nuclear weapons.
Essentially, the argument starts by establishing that the use or
threatened use of nuclear arms would unequivocally violate the inter-
national law expounded in this section of the Article.
On the other hand, the non-traditional defense need not "con-
clusively establish" the illegality of any aspect of nuclear arms.
Rather, as the argument continues in the next section, defendants
need only prove that it is at least "reasonable" to believe that the
amassing of such weapons will inevitably lead to their use.2 3
The first step in the defense is to establish that international law
is binding on domestic courts in the United States. The Constitution
of the United States unequivocally declares that "all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." '24 Accordingly, the United
States Supreme Court has held: "International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
the appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination.,
25
The status of general international law in domestic cases has
been expressed in a similar fashion: "Courts of this country have the
obligation to respect and enforce international law not only by virtue
of this country's status and membership in the community of nations
but also because international law is a part of the law of the United
States.",26 In the words of one federal court: "There can be no dis-
pute about the proposition that American courts are bound to recog-
nize and apply the Law of Nations as part of the law of the land.",27
To determine what constitutes international law, the Supreme
22. L.A. Daily J., Oct. 26, 1982, at 2, col. I.
23. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
24. Art. VI, cl. 2.
25. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
26. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
afid, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
27. United States v. Melekh, 190 F.Supp. 67, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also, The Nereids,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 423 (1815); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Vol. 16
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Court has held that the content of the law of nations "may be ascer-
tained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on pub-
lic laws; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial
decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."2
The Court subsequently explained that,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works
of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and
experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with
the subject of which they treat.29
Turning now to particular treaties, the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 3° is a part of the United Nations Charter and
is therefore a treaty binding on the United States. 3' The Statute lists
the following official sources of international law:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means.
32
In sum, two points should be clear. First, the definition and
content of international law is fairly expansive; second, international
law is fully binding on United States domestic courts.
Moreover, on grounds of public policy domestic courts should
be eager to recognize international law. As one trial judge observed,
"The effective method to promote adherence to the standards im-
posed by international law is to enforce these standards in municipal
[for example, domestic] courts, particularly in view of the poverty
28. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 71, 74 (1820).
29. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (1900). See also, Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505
F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980).
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 38.
31. It is unquestioned in federal courts that "[a]s a treaty ratified by the United States, the
[United Nations] Charter is part of the supreme law of the land." Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v.
United States, 90 F. Supp. 831, 832 (N.D. Calif. 1950). State courts have held the same. See,
e.g., Fujii v. State of California, 38 Cal.2d 718, 721, 242 P.2d 617, 619-20 (1952). "It is not
disputed that the [United Nations] Charter is a treaty, and our federal Constitution provides
that treaties made under the authority of the United States are part of the supreme law of the
land and that the judges in every state are bound thereby."
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 38.
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and inadequacy of international remedies.""a In the same case the
appellate court added a reminder not to confuse public policy with
the narrower concerns of nationalism. "One pitfall into which we
could stumble would be the identification as a fundamental principle
of international law some principle which is in truth only an aspect of
the public policy of our own nation. . .. ""
More than two dozen international treaties, conventions, and
resolutions apply to the research, development, stockpiling, use, and
threatened use of nuclear weapons. The most pertinent language of
each such source of international law will be presented in the order in
which the documents came into existence.
In 1868 the Declaration of St. Petersburg 5 observed that be-
cause "the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviat-
ing, as much as possible, the calamities of war," that "this object
would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly ag-
gravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevita-
ble." Accordingly the Treaty declared that "the employment of such
arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity. "36
Shortly after the turn of the century, the major nations of the
world gathered to produce an historical series of international agree-
ments concerning the conduct of war. The 1907 Hague Convention
divided the subject into a series of provisions governing war's differ-
ent aspects. The preamble to the Hague Convention (War on Land)
declared that it is "important to revise the laws and general customs
of war" in order to establish "certain limits for the purpose of modi-
fying their severity as far as possible."37 Moreover, the parties recog-
nized the need to prevent unknown future weapons from violating
the principles they were establishing: "The High Contracting Parties
clearly do not intend that unforseen cases should, in the absence of a
written undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgment of military
commanders. 318 Thus, declared the parties,
in cases not included in the regulations adopted by them, popula-
tions and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of
the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, and from the laws of human-
33. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 193 F. Supp. at 382.
34. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 307 F.2d at 861.
35. Declaration of St. Petersberg Nov. 29-Dec. II, 1868, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 95.
36. Id.
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ity, and the requirements of the public conscience. 9
The importance of this paragraph to the issue at hand is crucial.
One international law scholar explains it as follows: "[T]his general
rule, known as the Martens Clause, makes the principles of humanity
and the dictates of public conscience obligatory by themselves, with-
out the formulation of a treaty specifically prohibiting a new
weapon."'
The Hague Treaty next narrowed its focus to listing particular
practices of war prohibited by the contracting parties: weapons that
"poisoned"; weapons that would "kill or wound treacherously";
''projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering";
and weapons that would unnecessarily "destroy . . . the enemy's
property."'" The Treaty also outlawed "the attack or bombardment,
by whatever means, [of] towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which
are undefended" and mandated that "all necessary steps must be
taken to spare . . . buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where
the sick and wounded are collected. . ". ."' Bombardment from the
sea was similarly restricted by the Hague Convention (Naval Bom-
bardment by Naval Forces in Time of War).4 3 The final historic seg-
ment was the 1907 Hague Convention (Rights of Neutrals), which
declared that "The territory of neutral powers is inviolate.""
In addition to the unparalleled degree of death and suffering
caused by the initial thermal and blast waves, one of the uniquely
terrifying aspects of nuclear bombs is the lingering painful death
caused by poisonous radioactive fallout.4 5 Of course, the widespread
and indiscriminate destruction of entire undefended towns, villages,
people, and buildings--of combatants and noncombatants, neutral
and hostile parties-is also inherent in the detonation of nuclear
39. Id.
40. Meyrowitz, Nuclear Weapons Policy: The Ultimate Tyranny, 7 NOVA L.J. 93, 97
(1982).
41. Hague Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. The United States is a
signatory.
42. Id.
43. Hague Convention Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, 2363-64, T.S. No. 542. The United
States is a signatory.
44. Hague Convention (Rights of Neutrals) Oct. 18, 1907, art. I, 36 Stat. 2310, 2322, T.S.
No. 540. See also, Hague Convention (Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War)
Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2415, 2427, T.S. No. 545. The United States is a signatory to both
these conventions.
45. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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weapons.46 It must, therefore, at the very least be "reasonable" to
believe that the use of nuclear weapons violates both the letter and
spirit of the St. Petersburg Declaration and the Hague Convention.
As the world advanced into the Twentieth Century, numerous
other declarations of international law were issued and remain rele-
vant to the issue of nuclear weapons. They will be summarized
chronologically.
The 1919 Treaty of Peace With Germany repeated the illegality
of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids,
materials or devices."47 In the 1922 Treaty in Relation to the Use of
Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, poisonous devices were
regarded as "having been justly condemned by the general opinion of
the civilized world."4 Accordingly the signatories declared the pro-
hibition of such devices was "universally accepted as part of interna-
tional law binding alike the conscience and practice of nations."
49
The 1925 Geneva Protocol on Poison Gas and Bacteriological War-
fare reiterated the international condemnation of weapons consisting
of poisonous materials.5° Without question, the lethal radiation of
nuclear weapons-threatening extinction of all planetary life within
months of widespread detonation '-,makes their use a violation of
these treaties.
In the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Treaty the major powers of the
world entered into an historical agreement to "condemn recourse to
war. . . [and to] renounce it as an instrument of national policy."
'52
The parties pledged that the resolution of international disputes
"shall never be sought except by pacific means." '  Although Allied
participation in World War II may be viewed as a necessary means to
survive German and Japanese attacks-and thus not a violation of
Kellogg-Briand---the United States official nuclear policy of "mutu-
ally assured destruction" is explicitly designed to terminate interna-
tional disputes by ultimately terminating life on the planet. That
46. Id.
47. 1919 Treaty of Peace With Germany, June 28, 1919, art. 171, 2 Bevans 43.
48. Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, Feb. 6,
1922, art. V, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 57.
49. Id.
50. 1925 Geneva Protocol on Poison Gas aod Bacteiological Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26
U.S.T. 573, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
51. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
52. Kellogg-Briand Treaty: Renunciation of War as a National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928,
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doing so also violates international law becomes a macabre
understatement.
The 1940 Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Pres-
ervation in the Western Hemisphere was a pledge of signatories "to
take appropriate measures . . . to prevent the threatened extinction
of any given species" as well as its "natural habitat" and "native
flora."54 At first glance this may appear a mere treaty to protect
wildlife. Only when one appreciates the capacity of nuclear weapons
to devastate the entire planet does one realize that all species of flora
and fauna-including that of Homo sapiens-are jeopardized by
atomic weapons. At the very least, research, development, manufac-
ture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons is not an "appropriate mea-
sure" for preserving an endangered species.
In the 1941 Atlantic Charter the United States and the Soviet
Union, inter alia, recognized that "no further peace can be main-
tained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by na-
tions which threaten . ..aggression outside of their frontiers."5 "
The two countries also agreed "that the disarmament of such nations
is essential."5 6 Accordingly, they pledged to "aid and encourage all
other practical measures which will lighten for peace-loving people
the crushing burden of armaments." '57
Of more than passing significance is the world's preeminent in-
ternational legal document, the 1945 United Nations Charter. In it
the United States and others pledged to "refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force . ... "58 In the United
States, however, the increased production of various missiles
designed to deliver atomic warheads and the production of nuclear
weapons for such purpose violates both the spirit and letter of this
treaty.
In the 1945 Nuremberg Charter the United States agreed that
"planning [or] preparation of a. . .war in violation of international
treaties, agreements, or assurances" constituted a "crime against
peace."59 The Charter also stated that "violations of the law or cus-
toms of war . . , [including] wanton destruction of cities, towns or
54. Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemi-
sphere, Oct. 12, 1940, preamble, 56 Stat. 1354, T.S. No. 981, 3 Bevans 630.
55. Atlantic Charter, Declaration of Principles, Aug. 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 1603, E.A.S. No.
236. The United States is a signatory.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Chapter 1, art. 2, sec. 4.
59. The Nuremberg Charter, supra, note 9. The United States is a signatory.
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villages . . ." was a "war crime."'" It next declared that "extermi-
nation. . . and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during war. . ." were "crimes against human-
ity."' 6I Finally, it asserted that official sanctioning of such interna-
tional law violations by government would not absolve an individual
from responsibility for such crimes.62
The conclusion appears quite reasonable-given the unparal-
leled capacity for wanton destruction of cities and extermination of
civilian populations-the use of nuclear weapons would violate the
Nuremberg Charter.
Turning particularly to the subject of genocide, its occurrence
has long been regarded as a core human rights violation whose ille-
gality under international law is unquestioned.63
In 1948 the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide included in its domain acts
such as "killing members of the group; causing serious bodily injury
or mental harm; inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; [and] im-
posing measures intended to prevent births. . . ."' Can it be gain-
said that nuclear weapons cause genocide in violation of this treaty?
The 1949 Geneva Convention pledges protection for civilians
during war "against acts of violence or threats thereof. . ." and pro-
hibits "any measure of such character as to cause physical suffering
or exterminations., 6  The violence, pain, and civilian extermination
caused by nuclear weapons make them a violation of this convention
as well. Referring to this treaty, one scholar of international law has
stated:
Given the evidence developed by doctors and scientists as to the
medical and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons, it is
clear that it would be impossible under conditions of nuclear war




63. Bium & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights Claims, 22
HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (198 1); See also, Edwards, Contributions of the Genocide Convention to the
Development of International Law, 8 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 300 (1981).
64. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Although over a hundred nations are signatories to this convention,
the United States is not.
65. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, art. 32, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 911 U.N.T.S. 376. The
United States is a signatory.
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would also be impossible to live up to the dictates of the Hague
Conventions-both of which aim at preserving the minimum re-
quirements for the continued survivability and viability of all soci-
eties involved in armed conflict.66
The use or threat of force is thus no longer a matter of discretion to
be left in the hands of individual States, but is subject to international
legal control.
Consistent with this well-established principle, a 1961 UN Reso-
lution declares that nuclear weapons violate the UN Charter; their
use is contrary to the laws of humanity and constitutes a crime
against mankind.6 7 Is this not a clear expression of the international
illegality of nuclear arms?
In 1963 the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests urged the
"speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and com-
plete disarmament . . .which would put an end to the armaments
race." 68 It also sought "to put an end to the contamination of man's
environment by radioactive substances."' 69 Five years later the Pro-
tocol to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America endorsed a "total prohibition of the use and manufacture of
nuclear weapons. "70 The parties recognized the following:
That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has
made it imperative that the legal prohibition of war should be
strictly observed in practice if the survival of civilization and of
mankind itself is to be assured.
That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffering, indis-
criminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian popula-
tions alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity
they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and
ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable. .... 71
It is hard to imagine stronger international condemnation of the nu-
clear arms race and more official recognition of the capacity of nu-
clear weapons to annihilate mankind's existence.
Similarly the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty feared the "devas-
66. Meyrowitz, supra note 40, at 99-100.
67. G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at, U.N. Doc. A/4942/Add. 3
(1961).
68. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, United States-Great Britain-U.S.S.R., preamble, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S.
5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
69. Id.
70. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, pre-
amble, 22 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 326.
71. Id.
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tation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war" and
that "the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance
the danger of nuclear war."72 The United States and other signato-
ries declared "their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date
the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective
measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament." '73 Moreover, the
Treaty's stated objective was the "cessation of the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and
the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the
means of their delivery. . . . " The parties pledged to "pursue ne-
gotiations in good faith" relating to ending the nuclear-arms race and
commencing nuclear disarmament.75
Over fifteen years have passed since this Treaty was signed. As
yet there has been no cessation of the nuclear arms race, no com-
mencement of nucle.?.r disarmament--only a terrifying increase in the
amount of nuclear arms, threats to use them, and the consequent
probability of nuclear holocaust by accident or design.
7 6
The 1971 Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War under-
scored the "devastating consequences that nuclear war would have
for all mankind."' 77 However, the document focused only on organi-
zational and technical arrangements" to prevent accidental nuclear
war.78 In that same year the Treaty on the Prohibition of Seabed
Nuclear Weapons optimistically considered itself "a step towards a
treaty on general and complete disarmament.,
79
Although there are as yet no legal instruments commanding
general nuclear weapons disarmament, in 1972 another weapons pro-
scription was established by international law. This occurred
through the Convention on the Development, Production and Stock-
72. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, preamble, 21




76. As an example, over a single eighteen-month period, the United States Department of
Defense admitted experiencing 151 false alarms of enemy attack, at least four of which placed
United States missile and bomber crews on increased alert. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1980 at A10,
col. 2.
77. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the
U.S. and U.S.S.R., Sept. 30, 1971, United States-Soviet Union, 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No.
7186.
78. Id.
79. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb.
11, 1971, preamble, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955 U.N.T.S. 115.
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piling of Bacteriological and Toxic Weapons." ° Its terms prohibit
"microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their ori-
gin."'" Because plutonium released from nuclear weapons is the sin-
gle most lethal microbial or biological agent known to mankind,
82
this post-nuclear convention further emphasizes the illegality of
atomic weapons under international law.
The 1973 Agreement Between the U.S. and the USSR on the
Prevention of War reiterated the premise that "nuclear war would
have devastating consequences for mankind."83 This was followed
by the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Humanitarian Law, which prohib-
ited "methods or means of warfare which . ..cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment."8 4 Also
proscribed were weapons or tactics that cause indiscriminate harm to
both combatants and noncombatants." Thus even within the last
decade international law has sought to avoid nuclear holocaust by
creating agreements based on the premise that the use of nuclear
arms is illegal.
Turning now to sources of international law other than treaties
and conventions, the first example of judicial condemnation of nu-
clear weapons was Japan's 1964 Shimoda case.8 6 After an exhaustive
analysis-touching on many of the points previously mentioned
here-the court held that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki in 1945 was prohibited under international law:
It is a deeply sorrowful reality that the atomic bombing on both
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki took the lives of many civilians,
and that among the survivors there are people whose lives are still
imperilled owing to the radial rays, even today 18 years later. In
this sense, it is not too much to say that the pain brought by the
atomic bombs is severer than that from poison and poison-gas, and
we can say that the act of dropping such a cruel bomb is contrary
to the fundamental principle of the laws of war that unnecessary
80. 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583, 587. The United States is a signatory.
81. Id.
82. H. CALDICOTT, NUCLEAR MADNESS (1982).
83. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1478, T.I.A.S. 7654.
84. 1977 Geneva Protocol on Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, Aug. 15,
1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 16 I.L.M. 1391.
85. Id.
86. Reported in, THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 212-52 (No. 8,
1964).
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pain must not be given.8 7
The court reached the above conclusions of illegality despite argu-
ments that the bombing was not illegal because no law at that time
specifically proscribed nuclear weapons.8 "
In accord with Shimoda, numerous international law texts ad-
dressing the status of nuclear weapons have supported the "reason-
able" conclusion of their illegality.8 9 In discussing Shimoda, a
leading international law scholar has made the following observation
about the illegality of atomic weapons:
[A] prohibition need not be direct or express to be applicable. By
interpreting the spirit of existing rules or by extending their cover-
age through analogical reasoning it is possible to say that a new
development is embraced within the earlier prohibition. Further-
more, wider principles of international law underlie the specific
rules, and, if the use of the new weapon violates these principles, it
violates international law without requiring any specific rule.
Thus a court is free to conclude that atomic warfare violates inter-
national law, at least under certain circumstances, even in the ab-
sence of an express prohibition. 9°
Another international scholar summarized arguments concern-
ing the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons and concluded:
[T]he legality of nuclear weapons cannot be judged solely by the
existence or non-existence of a treaty rule specifically prohibiting
or restricting their use. Any reasonable analysis must take into
consideration all the recognized sources of international law-
treaties, custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions and
the writing of qualified publicists. Of particular relevance in eval-
uating nuclear weapons are the many treaties and conventions
which limit the use of weapons in war; the fundamental distinction
between combatant and non-combatant; and the principles of hu-
manity including the prohibition of weapons and tactics that are
especially cruel and cause unnecessary suffering. A review of these
basic principles supports the conclusion that the threat or use of
nuclear weapons pursuant to either a doctrine of massive retalia-
tion, mutual assured destruction, counterforce, or limited nuclear
87. Id. at 241-42.
88. Id.
89. See e.g., R. Falk, L. Meyrowitz, & J. Sanderson, Nuclear Weapons and International
Law, World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No. 10, 27-71 Center of International
Studies, Princeton University, (1981); Meyrowitz, The Status of Nuclear Weapons Under Inter-
national Law, 38 GUILD PRACTITIONER 65 (1981).
90. Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks Upon Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 771 (1965).
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war, is illegal under international law.9 1
Moreover, from an entirely different standpoint the use of nu-
clear arms can be reasonably labeled illegal. Fundamental principles
of international law require that in any context-including war or
the threat of war-the use of force be subject to the criterion of pro-
portionality. 92 By what stretch of the imagination can the genocidal
forces released by nuclear weapons be deemed proportional? For ex-
ample, the Shimoda case, held that the twelve kiloton bombs dropped
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were illegal under international law.93
Yet compared to the size of nuclear bombs carried in each of today's
cruise missiles, the military regards the Hiroshima-Nagasaki weap-
ons as merely "tactical."94
A final consideration is a basic premise of international law, that
controlling the wantonly destructive forces of war will hasten the re-
turn to a peaceful condition. Since the use of nuclear weapons will,
in all probability, leave no habitable planet on which to experience a
peaceful condition, it should at the very least be "reasonable" to re-
gard the use of nuclear weapons as illegal under international law.
C Domestic Law Recognizes the Citizen's Privilege to Take
Reasonable Steps to Prevent the Commission of Crime
The crime prevention privilege is summarized in one standard
treatise of Anglo-American criminal law:
[A]ny unoffending person may intervene for the purpose of
preventing the commission or consummation of any crime if he
does so without resorting to measures which are excessive under
all the facts of the particular case. 95 The question is not whether
force may be used but only under what circumstances and to what
91. Meyrowitz, supra note 40, at 96-97.
92. See McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L.
597-98 (1963); 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (1971); J. ScO'r, THE
HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 (1915); G. DRAPER, THE
RED CROSS CONVENTIONS (1958).
93. Supra note 86.
94. J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH 36 (1982).
95. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1108-09 (3d ed. 1982).
-One, not necessarily a police officer, is justified in using reasonable force to prevent or
terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission of a misdemeanor amounting to a
breach of the peace or of a felony." W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 403 (1972).
Although this Article deals only with the prevention of crime under international law,
there is a related privilege that may be concurrently invoked:
Important privileges overlap. They are the privilege (I) to intervene for the purpose
of preventing the perpetration of crime and (2) to defend person or property. To the
extent of the overlap both privileges are available to the one thus benefited. "It is not
necessary that he should intervene solely for the purpose of protecting the public
19
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extent. Any amount of such force is privileged if reasonably be-
lieved to be necessary for this purpose.
96
Virtually all jurisdictions within the United States recognize this
privilege either through statute or case law.97 In fact, there is a stat-
utory trend to increase the scope of the privilege beyond its common
law limits.9"
Of the various elements of the non-traditional Nuremberg De-
fense, the crime prevention component is the least susceptible to ar-
gument from precedent. This is partly because crime prevention is a
novel defense in protest cases, but also because the crime prevention
privilege itself relies heavily upon the concept of reasonable belief.
Although it is axiomatic that a reasonable belief is one honestly en-
tertained and created by attendant circumstances,99 reasonableness
itself is an elastic term, depending upon a multitude of considerations
and circumstances.
As a general rule courts will find a belief to be reasonable if a
positive correlation exists between an actor's perception of his or her
surroundings and his or her knowledge of what has gone before."
In cases of protest against nuclear arms, a positive correlation must
be demonstrated between the increasing numbers, types, and availa-
bility of nuclear arms and the increasing likelihood that such weap-
ons will, by design or accident, be detonated. Put simply, it must be
shown that it is reasonable to believe that the arms race inevitably
leads to the arms use.
To be sure, some correlations forming ingredients of the nuclear
arms issue have been so tested in tort litigation that their reasonable-
ness is regarded as axiomatic, for example, that explosives are dan-
order or of protecting the private interests imperiled. His act, though a single one,
may well be done for both purposes. If so, either privilege is available to him."
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra, at 1108, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Scope Note to
ch. 5, topic 2, at 250 (1965).
The privilege to defend one's property appears under various labels: "duress;" "coer-
cion;" "compulsion;" "justification;" "necessity;" (conceptually synthesized under California
law in People v. Pena, 149 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 14 (1983)); and "the choice-of-evils" defense.
96. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 95, at 1109.
97. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 692-94 (crime-prevention privilege generally); 197
(privilege to take human life) (Deering 1983); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 35.00-35.25 (McKinney
1975); IOWA CODE §§ 704.1-704.9 (1975).
98. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 95, at 1111. The trend would allow the privilege to
prevent non-violent crimes against property as well as those threatening bodily harm and a
breach of the peace. Id. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(5).
99. Howard v. State, 110 AIa. 92, 20 So. 365 (1896).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
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gerous, 0' that heavy objects fall,' 0 2 that fire burns 0 3 and will cause
flammable objects to catch fire,"° and that in certain situations fel-
low citizens have a propensity toward negligence and crime. 0 5
Courts have also deemed reasonable an assortment of beliefs con-
cerning human capacities, reactions and normal habits." 6
But correlating the nuclear arms race with nuclear arms use
cannot be done by stitching together truisms of physics and psychol-
ogy. Rather, it requires the court to take a broad, common sense
view of history. It must be kept in mind, however, that the burden is
not to prove the correlation absolute-or that what protesters believe
to be true is in fact true-but merely that the belief in such a correla-
tion was reasonable. As Perkins and Boyce point out:
[A]lthough it is possible to find an occasional suggestion indicating
otherwise, the reasonable mistake of fact doctrine applies to such
[crime prevention] cases and the privilege to use force, and the
degree of permissible force, are determined not by the actual facts
in this regard, but by the reasonable belief of the intervenor as to
the crime being committed or attempted and the force needed for
its prevention.'
07
Of course, the arguments here will be as varied as the beliefs of
each person involved. Summarized in rhetorical form, however, the
following points are basic to most protests against nuclear arms: (1)
Since the invention of crossbows, gunpowder, machine-guns, poison-
gas, airplanes, and submarines, when has any weapon ever been
adapted for military purposes and not used in warfare? (2) Was the
nuclear bombing of two Japanese civilian centers a mistake? (3)
Would any nation, especially of the character of the United States or
the Soviet Union, be likely to surrender in war when it possessed
weapons capable of destroying the enemy? (4) Would any military
101. City of Waco v. Dool, 254 S.W. 353, 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
102. Blomberg v. Trupukka, 210 Minn. 523, 299 N.W. 11 (1941).
103. Gates v. Boston & M.R.R. Co., 255 Mass. 297, 151 N.E. 320 (1926).
104. Lillibridge v. McCann, 117 Mich. 84, 75 N.W. 288 (1898); Gates v. Boston & M.R.R.
Co., 255 Mass. 297, 151 N.E. 320 (1926).
105. See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 290, 302 (1965). Accordingly, courts
have deemed it unreasonable to be ignorant of certain scientific advances as they become avail-
able. See e.g., Marsh Woods Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W.
392 (1932); Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W. 2d 140 (1944). It maybe drawn from
this latter point that the scientific evidence concerning nuclear winter is so well documented
and available to the public, that either the court's or jury's failure to recognize the correlation
between nuclear-arms detonation and global annihilation would be so unreasonable as to
amount to "negligence" on the part of the factfinder.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 (1965).
107. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 95, at I 111.
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field commander be likely to see his position overrun, his army cap-
tured, while still in possession of sixty-pound "tactical" nuclear
weapons?' °8 (5) With numerous "mistakes" occurring with United
States nuclear weapons in the last twenty years, isn't it increasing
likely that some future mishap may trigger an inter-continental nu-
clear exchange?
Appropriate responses to such questions may be provided
through judicially noticeable facts as well as experts in weapons,
computers, military history, sociology, and psychiatry. It is neces-
sary to identify the basis of each individual's reasons for believing the
availability of nuclear arms will lead to their use. In this connection
it is important to point out that just as those with superior knowledge
of certain fields have their reasonableness judged by standards of
other experts in the field," ° so should the beliefs of protestors who
have participated in scholarly study of the history and politics of the
nuclear arms race.
As shown at the outset of this section, the second prong of the
crime prevention privilege consists of showing the actor's crime pre-
vention means were reasonable. Most cases of nuclear protest in-
volve persons whose crime prevention efforts consisted of drawing
public attention to and exerting political pressure upon nuclear arms
facilities through their use of peaceful trespass or passive blockades.
Thus, it appears quite plausible that, compared to the global annihi-
lation threatened by nuclear arms, a passive protestor's means of pre-
vention is reasonable.
But even more violent actions have a valid claim to the crime
prevention privilege. Since the law deems even deadly force reason-
able to prevent the commission of crime likely to cause death or seri-
ous bodily harm," 0 a fortiori any action short of deadly force should
be reasonable to prevent nuclear Armageddon. Indeed, as has been
observed by leading commentators on the use of force in Anglo-
American law, where the threatened harm is especially great, reason-
able preventive action may consist of greater precautions than may
be normally required."'
As with the issue of reasonable belief, examples of reasonable
108. For nearly thirty years United States Army manuals have instructed commanders that
the use of nuclear weapons would not violate international law. See DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY FIELD MANUAL, 27-10, para. 35 (1956).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289, COMMENT M (1965).
110. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 95, at 111-12.
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302A (1965). Although this section con-
cerns actions required of a tort plaintiff to qualify as reasonable, the same rationale appears to
Vol. 16
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means vary with the circumstances of the situation. Yet here, too,
common points can be suggested in rhetorical form. (1) In light of
the fact that incoming intercontinental missiles give at the most
thirty minutes warning to United States citizens, how can any pre-
ventive action be effective if one waits for the civil-defense sirens? (2)
To be reasonable, must not any preventive action take place well in
advance of that time?" 2 (3) What can be more reasonable in a media
conscious democracy than informing industrial and governmental of-
ficials that they are in violation of international law? (4) Were not
significant strides in racial and sexual justice accomplished during
the last thirty years by just this type of action?
The defense may be confronted with the argument that "other
means are more reasonable" than those undertaken. Here, however,
the degree of reasonableness, measured on some sliding scale of alter-
native activity, is not the legal standard. The issue is whether the
actions were reasonable,' 3 not whether some other hypothetical ac-
tions would have been. Nevertheless, it may still be necessary to
point out the many United Nations Resolutions demanding the stop
of the nuclear arms race," 4 similar resolutions passed by over 150
towns in one state alone,'" the nationwide passage of a nuclear-
weapons-freeze resolution in 1982,16 the Nuclear Weapons Freeze
Resolution passed by the House of Representatives," 17 and the scores
of domestic and international demonstrations involving millions of
citizens protesting nuclear arms." 8  Because none of these actions
has been successful in halting the continued research, development,
stockpiling, and deployment of nuclear arms, protest actions should
appear at least reasonable.
It is also important to note that individuals have no access to the
apply to permissible actions. The late Professor Prosser expressed this concept with the follow-
ing formula:
The duty to take precautions against the negligence of others [is] merely a matter of
the customary process of multiplying the probability that such negligence will occur
by the magnitude of the harm likely to result if it does, and weighing the result
against the burden upon the [other party] of exercising such care.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 172 (4th ed. 1971).
112. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 465 F.2d 528
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (preventative action intended to protect the planet and its environment re-
quires more "lead time" than mere hours or days).
113. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 95 at 1108-9.
114. See supra note 21(a) and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 21(b) and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 21(f) and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 2 1(c) and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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International Court of Justice;" 9 that it is unlikely the United States
government will prosecute its own officers or contractors in any fo-
rum as international criminals; and that after the actual use of nu-
clear weapons it is extremely unlikely that anyone will remain to
prosecute or be prosecuted for committing crimes against peace, war
or humanity. In the light of such futile forensic alternatives, any pro-
test actions should be viewed as reasonable.
Ultimately the question of reasonableness is a question of fact to
be determined by a jury of the protestors' peers. 20 No judicial find-




Today's criminal courts increasingly see defendants who have
protested the research, manufacturing, deployment, and threatened
use of nuclear weapons. The legal system must squarely and ration-
ally face the terrifying issue these cases present; the potential annihi-
lation of all life on the planet. The non-traditional Nuremberg
Defense provides a viable approach to this issue. Under this defense
protestors rely on the conventional crime prevention privilege, but
link it to international law to show that the target of their protest was
involved in international crime. Thus the central issue becomes
whether it was reasonable for the defendants to believe that the re-
search, manufacture, deployment, or threatened use of nuclear arms
was in violation of law. That this issue is largely one of fact to be
resolved by a jury enables courts to avoid the constitutional pitfalls of
political questions and of separation of powers. Because a central
119. Statute of the Int'l Court of Justice, Art. 34.1 (1945).
120. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 75 Cal. App. 3d 731, 142 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1977) (the issue
of reasonableness of force is a question of fact for the jury to determine); People v. Young, 214
Cal. App. 2d 641, 646, 29 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1963); Lowry v. Standard Oil Co., 54 Cal. App. 2d
782, 790-91 (1941) (The jury must determine whether "a reasonable man, situated as defendant
was, seeing what he saw, and knowing what he knew, would be justified in believing himself in
danger.").
121. To the judge who invokes the doctrines of political question or separation of powers, it
should be pointed out that no judicial holding is required concerning the legality of nuclear
arms. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). Rather the defense requests the simple and
uniquely judicial function of admitting evidence so that the jury can determine as a matter of
fact whether the defendants believed and acted upon bases that were reasonable. To the judge
who challenges the defendant's "standing" to bring such a defense, it should be observed that
standing is a concept used in the limited jurisdiction of federal courts to dismiss plaintiffs' civil
actions. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), (not criminal defendants with the constitutional right under the
Fifth Amendment to present their defense).
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function of the judicial system is to control the use of force, and nu-
clear arms represent mankind's ultimate force, the resolution of this
issue may well be the courts' ultimate challenge.
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